The Grapes of McGrath : The Supreme Court and the Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath (1951) by Goldstein, Robert Justin
The Grapes of McGrath:
The Supreme Court and the
Attorney General’s List of
Subversive Organizations in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath (1951)
ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN∗
The so-called Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations (AGLOSO) was one of
the most central and widely publicized aspects of the post–World War II Red Scare, which has
popularly—if inaccurately—become known as “McCarthyism.” Like many other elements of
the Red Scare, the AGLOSO in fact predated the emergence of Senator Joseph McCarthy on the
national political red-hunting scene. It originated in President Harry Truman’s Executive Order
9835 of March 21, 1947, which required all federal civil-service employees to be screened for
“loyalty” and specified that one criterion to be used in determinations that “reasonable grounds
exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal” would be a finding of “membership in,
affiliation with or sympathetic association” with any organization determined by the Attorney
General to be “totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive” or advocating or approving
the forceful denial of constitutional rights to other persons or seeking “to alter the form of
Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.”1 Beginning in late 1947, the
federal government began publishing AGLOSO lists, which ultimately reached almost 300
organizations, without offering the targeted groups either hearings, specific charges, or advance
notice. This led Washington Post editorial writer Alan Barth to term the Attorney General’s
AGLOSO mandate “perhaps the most arbitrary and far-reaching power ever exercised by a
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In 1947, President Harry Truman mandated that federal civil-service employees be screened for loyalty, with
one consideration their membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association; with organizations deter-
mined by the Attorney General to be Communist, Fascist, totalitarian, or subversive. Pictured are government
postal workers in the 1940s.
single public official” in American history, effectively allowing that official to “stigmatize” and
“in effect, proscribe any organization of which he disapproves.”2 Although the only officially
announced purpose of the AGLOSO was to provide guidance in federal civil-service loyalty
determinations, it quickly became used by a wide variety of public and private organizations
as the basis for discriminating against persons alleged to be affiliated with listed organizations
and the groups themselves. Thus, it was utilized by state and local governments, the military,
defense contractors, hotels, the Treasury Department (in making determinations regarding tax
exemption) and the State Department (in making passport decisions), to cite only a few of many
examples.3 FBI Intelligence Division official A. H. Belmont wrote to Assistant FBI Director
D. M. Ladd on March 18, 1952 that AGLOSO listings had been “found from experience to
have substantially impeded the effectiveness of the [designated] organization.”4 Both scholars
and the general press have clearly agreed with this assessment. Various scholars have written
that the AGLOSO, which was massively publicized in the media, became what amounted to
“an official black list”5 and “usually a kiss of death”6 to listed groups, which came to have in
the public mind “authority as the definitive report on subversive organizations,” understood as
a “proscription of the treasonable activity of the listed organizations”7 and the “litmus test for
distinguishing between loyalty and disloyal organizations and individuals.”8 Thus, an April 28,
1949 New York Times story about the listing of additional AGLOSO organizations was headlined
“Government Proscribes 36 More Groups as Subversive, 23 of Them ‘Communist,’” while a
number of files related to the AGLOSO held in the Eisenhower presidential library are marked
“blacklisted organizations.”9 In an article entitled “What the Attorney General’s List Means,”
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the November, 1956 Elks Magazine began by accurately noting that “there are few Americans
who have not heard of ‘the Attorney General’s subversive list’” and concluded by summarizing
the AGLOSO’s clear message: “There is no excuse for any American citizen becoming affiliated
with a group on the Attorney General’s list today.”
In April 1951, in a decision featured in
front-page headlines across the country, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck the first major blow
against the AGLOSO, in a complex and am-
biguous decision, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. [Atorney General Howard]
McGrath,10 which overruled six lower court
decisions and required that three designated or-
ganizations be allowed to contest their listings.
The High Court ruling concerned the Joint
Anti-Refugee Committee (JAFRC), the Na-
tional Committee on American-Soviet Friend-
ship (NCASF), and the International Workers
Order (IWO), three clearly left-wing organiza-
tions, which were among the largest and most
prominent AGLOSO-designated groups.
The JAFRC had been licensed in 1942
to provide medical aid for Spanish Civil War
loyalist refugees in France by President Roo-
sevelt’s War Relief Control Board and, like
the other organizations, had been granted
tax-exempt status by the Treasury Depart-
ment which had been withdrawn following its
AGLOSO designation. The JAFRC included
Communists in its leadership, but, like the
other two organizations, was never accused
of illegal activities. However, early on it at-
tracted the attention of the House of Represen-
tatives Committee on Un-American Activities
(HUAC), resulting in 1946 contempt-of-court
sentences against its entire leadership for
failing to supply HUAC with subpoenaed
records. The NCASF was organized to pro-
mote Soviet-American friendship at a 1942
New York City mass meeting which received
greetings from President Roosevelt and Vice
President Henry Wallace, was sponsored by
three Cabinet members, and was attended
by 20,000 people, who heard speeches from
New York Governor Herbert Lehman, New
York City Mayor Fiorello Laguardia, and
conservative American Federation of Labor
President William Green. A 1944 NCASF
dinner held to celebrate the twenty-sixth
anniversary of the Soviet Army received
congratulatory messages from five American
generals, including Dwight Eisenhower and
Douglas MacArthur; its membership included
at least three Congressmen and Secretary of
the Interior Harold Ickes. During the Cold
War, the NCASF became widely viewed as
an outlet for Soviet propaganda and its di-
rector was found in contempt of Congress in
1946 for failing to provide HUAC with subpoe-
naed records. The IWO, the largest organiza-
tion ever AGLOSO-listed while still function-
ing, was a fraternal insurance benefit society
chartered by the state of New York that, al-
though clearly under very substantial Commu-
nist Party (CP) influence, enrolled over one
million Americans (fewer than five percent of
them CP members) between 1939 and 1950. It
was praised during World War II by a variety
of public officials, including Ickes and Senator
Robert Wagner (D-NY), was awarded a Trea-
sury Department certificate of merit for selling
almost $300,000 in war bonds, and had repeat-
edly received high evaluations in regular re-
views by New York state and private insurance
raters.11
Each of the three organizations had origi-
nally filed separate suits against the Attorney
General and other federal officials in federal
district court in Washington, D.C. in 1948 and
1949, maintaining that their listing had un-
constitutionally denied them free-speech and
due-process rights by damaging their ability
to conduct legitimate activities, by impairing
their reputations and fostering a wide range
of reprisals against them, and by depriving
them of any opportunity to contest their des-
ignations. For example, with regard to First
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Amendment rights, the NCASF maintained
that it and its affiliates had been “seriously
frustrated and unduly burdened” in exercising
its First Amendment rights, as it had “lost nu-
merous members, officers and sponsors; lost
public support; lost contributions; lost atten-
dance at meetings; lost circulation of their pub-
lications; lost acceptance by colleges, schools
and organizations of their exhibits and other
material; have been denied meeting places;
have been denied radio time;” lost their Fed-
eral tax exemption, costing “large sums of
money which they would otherwise have re-
ceived as contributions;” and lost the ability
to “get members and support from federal
employees,” who feared that their “employ-
ment would be jeopardized.” Beyond the al-
leged damage to their First Amendment rights,
the three organizations maintained that their
Fifth Amendment due-process rights had been
violated because the government’s AGLOSO
designations were arbitrary, especially by not
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granting them hearings or other procedures al-
lowing contestation of their listings. Thus, the
IWO maintained that its listing was “without
warrant in law” and “without the slightest basis
in truth or in fact and was made without no-
tice or opportunity to be heard, without finding
of fact or conclusions of law and without any
prior or accompanying statement of explana-
tion.” Both the NCASF and the IWO explic-
itly denied that their activities provided any
basis for their AGLOSO designations, while
the JAFRC did so implicitly by describing its
activities as solely dedicated to aiding Spanish
refugees.12
The Justice Department filed two-
sentence rejoinders to each of the three law-
suits, simply maintaining that the complaints
failed to “state a claim” against the govern-
ment “upon which relief can be granted.” In
three separate federal district court rulings in
1948 and 1949 judges upheld the government.
The JAFRC suit was dismissed without ex-
planation in June 1948. In a February 1949
ruling in the NCASF case, Judge Jennings
Bailey declared that there could be no legal
remedy for the “indirect effect” of AGLOSO
designations upon organizations, which did
not “constitute legal damage” or in any way
subject them “to any civil or criminal liabil-
ity” and which were related to a governmen-
tal program whose sole purpose was to le-
gitimately facilitate the administration of fed-
eral loyalty screenings. In April 1949, Judge
Matthew McGuire similarly ruled against the
IWO, holding that it lacked standing to sue be-
cause it had shown no “unlawful invasion of
some legally protected right,” as the AGLOSO
listing was not a “controlling” government ac-
tion, but only the equivalent of “advice” to the
President which, by implication, governmen-
tal agencies and others could utilize or not at
their discretion.13
Things went little differently in the federal
court of appeals for the District of Columbia,
although here the Justice Department gave
a slightly longer response, which included
sweeping claims that the AGLOSO was based
on executive powers not subject to judicial re-
view and that, in any case, the AGLOSO in-
flicted no concrete damage on the complain-
ing organizations that required a legal remedy.
In the JAFRC appeal, for example, the De-
partment maintained that the AGLOSO des-
ignation imposed “no restrictions whatever”
upon the JAFRC, which remained free to con-
duct its business, raise money, voice its views
and publish its beliefs, as the listing issued
“no directive to other federal, state, or mu-
nicipal officials” and did not “command the
appellant to do or to refrain from doing any-
thing.” Moreover, the Department maintained,
the Attorney General was constitutionally au-
thorized to “designate appellant as a commu-
nist organization” as an agent of the President
in carrying out his responsibilities to regu-
late admission to the civil service, and “cer-
tain executive powers” were “not subject” to
court review, “clearly” including the “right to
speak forth freely to the nation and inform it
of groups deemed to be operating against the
best interests of our constitutional government
itself.” The Department added that it was “un-
tenable” to assert that the Attorney General
could “under any circumstances be restrained”
from informing the government and the na-
tion about organizations that posed a “threat to
our democratic processes,” and that although
such power “might be subject to abuse,” the
only remedy was “the elective process,” or
impeachment of the President. In each case,
the appeals court endorsed the government’s
position. In the JAFRC case, for example, a
three-judge appeals panel declared by a 2–1
vote on August 11, 1949 that the organiza-
tion’s complaint failed to “present a justiciable
controversy” because the AGLOSO listing and
Truman’s Loyalty Order “command[ed] noth-
ing of the Committee,” denied it “no author-
ity, privilege, immunity or license,” subjected
it to “no liability, civil or criminal,” and “de-
nied no one” any “property rights” or “free-
dom of speech and assembly.” The decision
added that, in promulgating the AGLOSO, the
Attorney General had merely complied with
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presidential directives in providing “informa-
tion and advice” in pursuit of the government’s
legitimate interests in protecting the civil ser-
vice from “disloyal and subversive elements,”
that the Attorney General had only undertaken
“that which the President could have done for
himself,” in which case “his action would have
been within the realm of his executive power,
not subject to judicial review,” and thus the
AGLOSO’s “essential character” was that of
“acts of the President himself,” which could
not be “challenged legally.” The Court further
dismissed all challenges to procedural aspects
of the AGLOSO’s promulgation and publica-
tion, holding, for example, that lack of hear-
ings implied no due-process lapses because
the AGLOSO was a “necessary” step in im-
plementing the loyalty program, thus afford-
ing “no ground for judicial review” if, as one of
its “unavoidable consequences,” it happened to
“affect adversely” listed organizations “against
whom it is not directed.” In a vigorous dis-
sent that was twice the length of the majority
holding, Judge H. W. Edgerton maintained that
the AGLOSO designation of the JAFRC was
“contrary to fact, unauthorized and unconstitu-
tional” for numerous reasons. Thus, he argued
that “helping former Spanish Republicans is
not evidence of disloyalty to the government,”
that the designation of the JAFRC lacked “ba-
sic standards of fairness” by failing to grant
notice or hearing, and that the designation was
“defamatory” and had unconstitutionally im-
posed a “substantial clog” on the group’s First
Amendment rights without any showing of
“clear and present danger.” The federal appeals
court simply cited its JAFRC ruling in reject-
ing the NCASF appeal in October 1949, and
it relied heavily on it in similarly rebuffing the
IWO in March 1950.14
Following the appeals court rebuffs, the
three organizations appealed to the Supreme
Court, reiterating their previous arguments,
adding that their cases were highly significant
given the general context of increasing pres-
sures on civil liberties arising in the Cold War
atmosphere, and maintaining that the lower
courts had erred in holding that the govern-
ment bore no responsibility for injuries result-
ing from their AGLOSO designations. Thus,
the NCASF urged the Court to intervene be-
cause the issues raised were of “great pub-
lic importance,” since its case presented “an-
other application of the growing tendency of
the making of administrative decisions,” all
“invariably justified by a claim of the needs
of ‘internal security,’” which “seriously im-
pair individual liberties” without “procedural
safeguards” and “on the basis of secret ev-
idence locked in the bosom of the adminis-
trator and [therefore] never susceptible of re-
buttal by those affected.” It maintained that
its injuries were caused by governmental offi-
cials “stimulating others to take action,” and
that the Constitution nullified “sophisticated
as well as simple-minded encroachments on
the freedoms of speech and assembly” and
that therefore the contention that the Constitu-
tion distinguished between “indirect” and “di-
rect” abridgement of guaranteed rights lacked
any legal foundation. Moreover, it maintained,
the Attorney General’s “unfettered discretion”
with regard to making AGLOSO designations
meant that he could “list any organization
which incurs his displeasure,” all while claim-
ing the right to “resist any inquiry into his ille-
gal actions.” The NCASF brief concluded by
arguing that the Constitution gave “no power
to any government official to list organizations
as subversive or disloyal” and, citing the 1943
Supreme Court case of West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette (holding that govern-
ment had no right to demand orthodoxy of
the citizenry’s political beliefs, such as com-
pelling school children to pledge allegiance
to the flag), declared that the AGLOSO effec-
tively allowed the Attorney General “to make
himself a judge of political orthodox and loy-
alty” and to “inform the public that certain
ideas are officially discouraged and prohib-
ited,” thus violating “the most revered tradi-
tions of our Constitution.”15
In its seventy-eight-page petition for cer-
tiorari, the JAFRC maintained that it had
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suffered concrete adverse impacts upon its
property and constitutional rights. It also ar-
gued that because the “executive power is no
more immune from judicial review” than any
other form of governmental action, it had le-
gal standing and its grievances did present a
“justiciable controversy.” The JAFRC termed
it “immaterial” that the injury it had suffered
was “occasioned by publicity and [that] re-
spondents’ conduct did not assume the more
formal, orthodox, and traditional forms of gov-
ernmental action,” because the “prestige and
the power” behind a “label attached and dis-
seminated by an official agency of the govern-
ment” was especially damaging. The JAFRC
urged that “there must be some limits to the
use of prestige and power of high public of-
fice to stigmatize individuals and organiza-
tions,” and that a contrary holding could even
allow the AGLOSO to list “religions or races
as well as organizations” and to permit “the
process of judicial review, which in this coun-
try is the cornerstone of constitutional govern-
ment,” to be “circumvented upon every occa-
sion when officials conceive some ingenious
or novel mode of wielding power.” The brief
also rejected claims that the AGLOSO only
concerned civil-service employees and did not
directly threaten First Amendment rights, on
the ground that “the purpose of the publica-
tion of the list” was to “affect the freedom of
thought, expression, and association of every
organization labeled or capable of being la-
beled as ‘subversive’ by the Attorney General
and to every person associated with such an
organization.”
The Justice Department responded to the
briefs with short responses that urged denial
of certiorari by reiterating its stance that no
grounds existed to consider the lawsuit because
“no justiciable controversy” was involved and
the organizations had no legal standing be-
cause they had suffered no injury at the hands
of the government. In its response to the
JAFRC brief, for example, the Department
maintained that the AGLOSO “in no way”
changed the JAFRC’s “existing or legal sta-
tus,” imposed “no regulation or directive lim-
iting the operation or conduct of petitioner’s af-
fairs,” included “no directive to other federal,
state, or municipal officers which in any way
subjects petitioner to the contingency of fu-
ture administrative action,” and subjected “nei-
ther petitioner nor its members to any crim-
inal or civil penalties, either immediate or
postponed.” Moreover, the government main-
tained, any damage to the JAFRC’s “advanta-
geous relationship with others” alleged to stem
from its AGLOSO designation “largely” arose
“from the force of public opinion and not from
the direct action of respondents.” And in any
case, it was legally “well settled that public
officials are absolutely privileged to publish
even false and defamatory matter in the exer-
cise of official duties” and it was “plain that
this alleged defamation was an official com-
munication as to matters within the authority
of respondents.”16
The Supreme Court separately granted
certiorari in each of the three cases during
1950, leading to another series of exchanges
of legal briefs in which the three organiza-
tions and the Justice Department reiterated and
elaborated upon their prior arguments, often
in far sharper terms that reflected the grow-
ing Cold War tensions associated with the out-
break of the Korean War in June 1950 and Sen-
ator Joseph McCarthy’s appearance on the anti-
Communist scene in February 1950. Thus, in
its September 1950 brief, the NCASF argued
that the AGLOSO and the Appeals Court rul-
ing that sustained it were “incompatible with a
government of laws and freedom,” as “without
procedural safeguards, on the basis of secret
evidence locked in the bosom of an adminis-
trative officer and never susceptible of rebut-
tal by those affected, and without fulfilling any
legitimate governmental purpose” the govern-
ment had “made an auto-da-fe for the ideas
espoused” by the NCASF and the Appeals
Court had only “heaped fuel on the flames.”
Responding to the lower court’s ruling that it
had no standing to sue because it had suffered
no direct injury from the AGLOSO, the brief
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characterized such reasoning as effectively
holding that First Amendment freedoms re-
quired no judicial protection from the govern-
ment so long as they were abridged by “so-
phisticated” and “subtle” indirect methods and
by “insidious” pressures such as those “here
employed,” such as an official “blacklist” and
“index,” rather than “by an outright interdic-
tion.” Therefore, the NCASF argued, the ap-
peals court, reflecting a “callous attitude to-
wards the right of political dissent” and mixing
“bad logic with misread precedents,” had com-
mitted the “fundamental constitutional error”
of failing to “discharge its primary obligation
to give vitality to the Bill of Rights” and trans-
late it into “living law.” Thus, upholding its rul-
ing would “imply that the courts have virtually
withdrawn from the function of protecting civil
liberties.”
According to the NCASF brief, the im-
pact of an AGLOSO listing upon an organi-
zation could be compared to that of a govern-
ment “requirement that Jews wear arm-bands,”
effectively embodying in both cases an offi-
cial determination that the targeted group or
individual “is obnoxious to the government”
and an intent to stimulate “the public to shun
or harm it,” thus presenting as “blatant an in-
stance as ever there was in which governmen-
tal authority seeks to censor unpopular ideas
by indirect and unhanded efforts.” Especially
given the real-world impact of the AGLOSO
upon groups, the brief maintained that the
AGLOSO effectively constituted an official
government “regulation” and was thus fatally
flawed by its “total disregard of due process”
by giving the Attorney General “unfettered
discretion,” which allowed him to list “any or-
ganization which incurs his displeasure,” re-
gardless of its aims, activities, or loyalty, and
by fostering the “irrational and dangerous”
practice of threatening federal employees’ jobs
for their organizational affiliations rather than
their individual performances. Clearly refer-
ring to Senator McCarthy, the brief termed the
loyalty program’s use of associations to judge
employees the “stock-in-trade of irresponsible
persons who are currently causing the demor-
alization of the federal service and the blasting
of individual reputations and careers.”17
In its October 1950 brief, the IWO main-
tained that “in light of the realities of today,”
it was “the sheerest sophistry for the Govern-
ment” to maintain that the IWO lacked stand-
ing because, for example, AGLOSO designa-
tion did not compel anyone to resign from
the IWO or to cancel his insurance, as the
First Amendment included in its protection of
American citizens against government actions
those that limited their freedoms by “not only
direct restraints but indirect ones as well.” In its
September 1950 brief, the JAFRC also rejected
the claim that the AGLOSO had inflicted no
“direct” injury upon it, maintaining that it put
“civil service employees and applicants on no-
tice that ‘association’ with the JAFRC will re-
sult in ineligibility,” and that in the “political
arena,” the “intended and actual effect” of be-
ing listed was to weaken or destroy “any ef-
ficacy among the electorate that such organi-
zations might possess.” The brief concluded
that even the “most elementary notions of fair
play dictates that before a group of Americans
may be officially stigmatized as ‘disloyal’ or
‘subversive’ they should be heard in their own
defense.”18
Previous government briefs defending the
AGLOSO had generally been short and almost
casual in tone. However, the Supreme Court’s
decision to hear the cases apparently came as a
considerable shock to the Justice Department,
which responded to the JAFRC brief with a
fifty-one-page reply, which it incorporated in
briefer responses to the NCASF and the IWO.
The Department essentially declared that the
AGLOSO was a “political” act promulgated
by the President in pursuit of his constitu-
tional powers to protect the nation and was
therefore completely beyond judicial review
and subject to correction only by elections
or impeachment. The reply also considerably
fleshed out the Department’s position that the
JAFRC lacked legal standing to challenge the
AGLOSO and that “no justiciable controversy”
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existed because the “list” allegedly failed to
directly impose any concrete penalties on the
organization, as it contained no “directive” to
“federal, state, or municipal officials which
in any way subjects petitioner to the contin-
gency of future administrative action” or any
“criminal or civil penalties either immediate or
postponed,” had no “legally operative effect on
First Amendment rights,” and did not even re-
quire federal employees to “disassociate them-
selves from petitioner’s activities” or “bar other
federal employees from becoming members,”
as it simply indicated that JAFRC affiliations
“may or may not be helpful” in making fed-
eral loyalty determinations “based on all the
evidence.” In any case, according to the De-
partment, “well settled” law established that
“utterances” made by public officials “are ab-
solutely privileged” against legal assaults “ir-
respective even of a claim of malicious moti-
vation,” and since here the Attorney General
was acting “as the agent and alter ego of the
President in the exercise of his primary exec-
utive power,” his act was a “political” one that
was “beyond the control of any other branch of
the Government except in the mode prescribed
by the Constitution through impeachment” or
via “the elective process.” This was especially
so at present, the brief argued, since Cold
War “tension and danger demands the utmost
vigor and vigilance on the part of the Presi-
dent to take action which he deems required
in the interest of national safety” and here
he sought only to exercise his “constitutional
and statutory authority” to regulate the “em-
ployment and discharge” of federal employ-
ees, which were “internal administrative mat-
ters concerning which the United States is free
to act as it pleases without judicial compulsion
or restraint at the insistence of an outsider such
as petitioner.” The Department maintained that
it was a “complete distortion of the intent and
purpose” of the AGLOSO to “conceive of it
as a ‘blacklist’ calculated to injure petitioner
by harassment and vilification,” and that any
“indirect consequences of public disclosure”
were beyond “the purview of the First Amend-
ment,” which banned interference with free
speech but did not state that “Congress or the
Executive may not inform the public” or seek
to “protect persons against unfavorable pub-
lic opinion, even though such opinion may be
stimulated by disclosures made by or to an in-
vestigating body.” Essentially, the Department
maintained, the JAFRC sought to restrain the
Attorney General, who had “been directed by
the President to determine and publish” the
AGLOSO (in fact Truman’s order made no
reference to publication), from complying, as
was his “clear duty under the Constitution,”
but “determinations made by the heads of de-
partment in the fulfillment of that duty are es-
sentially political, not judicial, in nature” and
were “decisions of a kind for which the ju-
diciary neither has the responsibility nor the
facilities to review.”19
The Supreme Court heard consolidated
oral argument in the three challenges to the
AGLOSO’s constitutionality on October 11,
1950, with both the New York Times and
the Washington Post, quite unusually, report-
ing the developments in lengthy news sto-
ries the following day. Only eight Justices
appeared at the Bench to hear the cases, as
Tom Clark, the former Attorney General who
had overseen the AGLOSO, abstained due to
conflict-of-interest concerns. Former assistant
attorney general O. John Rogge, represent-
ing the JAFRC, denounced the “list” as a
“star chamber” technique that made the At-
torney General’s “whims final and correct,”
while NCASF attorney David Rein termed
the AGLOSO a “kind of censorship,” cur-
rently “in its heyday as a technique for sup-
pressing political dissent,” which proclaimed
that “certain persons, organizations, literature,
or doctrine[s] are heretical, disloyal, subver-
sive, or otherwise officially obnoxious.” Af-
ter IWO attorney Allen H. Rosenberg declared
that his organization was the “only fraternal
benefit” society in the country that banned
segregation and welcomed “the Negro peo-
ple into membership,” Justice Robert H. Jack-
son inquired who might be excluded from
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the organization; when Rosenberg responded,
“perhaps professional strikebreakers,” Jack-
son dryly retorted, “They might not be very
good insurance risks anyway.”
Solicitor General Philip Perlman main-
tained for the government that careful
investigation had preceded the AGLOSO’s
promulgation, and he denied that any “whole-
sale blacklisting” of organizations had fol-
lowed it or that the plaintiff organizations had
suffered injury real enough to provide them le-
gal standing to challenge it. Perlman rejected
Rogge’s contention that AGLOSO’s real pur-
pose was to “regiment the American people,”
instead maintaining that its sole purpose was
to “protect and safeguard our form of gov-
ernment” and that it served only as a “guide”
and but “one element” in making federal loy-
alty determinations. When Justice Hugo Black
asked Perlman if even the Catholic church
could be listed, the Solicitor General said it
could. Moreover, under questioning Perlman
conceded that since listed organizations had
no right to a hearing or appeal, their only rem-
edy was “none” other than to have “the people
elect another President who will appoint an-
other Attorney General who will take it off.”
Justice Felix Frankfurter said the “crux” of the
cases was that listed groups were denied a hear-
ing, to which Perlman responded that hearings
would “ruin the whole loyalty program,” since
it would take “years and years” to settle the
status of even a single group.
The AGLOSO cases were clearly viewed
by the Supreme Court judges and their clerks
as simultaneously extremely divisive, impor-
tant, and politically explosive from the very
beginning, according to both the public record
of the Court and the files of Supreme Court
Justices that became available after their re-
tirement and/or deaths. Two Justices, Frank-
furter and Jackson, became so frustrated by the
Court’s handling of the cases that, as discussed
below, they lashed out at their colleagues in
extraordinarily harsh terms. Memos to the Jus-
tices from their clerks advising them concern-
ing whether to grant “cert,” and on the merits
of the cases once the Court had decided to con-
sider them, reflect significant division among
the clerks and between the clerks and their Jus-
tices and, above all, an acute sensitivity to the
political ramifications and importance of the
issues involved.20
In two instances, Justices rejected advice
from their clerks that the Court use the recent
passage of the 1950 McCarran Act, which pro-
vided for hearings before the newly created
Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB)
and the right to seek subsequent judicial re-
view before the government listed organiza-
tions (outside of specific consideration with
regard to government employment) as com-
munistic, as an excuse for either indefinitely
delaying any ruling on the cases or for back-
ing the government (despite the clerks’ con-
clusions that the AGLOSO organizations had
valid cases). Thus, in an undated eight-page
memo focused on the NCASF case apparently
written immediately before the Court heard
oral argument on October 11, 1950, one of Jus-
tice Harold Burton’s clerks (initials MS) con-
cluded that there was “no doubt” the organi-
zation had raised a “justifiable” issue, since
its AGLOSO listing was “just about to wreck”
its mission, the Attorney General’s procedure
“did not meet the procedural requirements”
of Truman’s order calling for “appropriate in-
vestigation and determination,” and there was
“no reason” why “relief cannot or should not
be given.” However, he recommended that the
Court should seek to avoid the “unpleasant
chore” of rebuking the executive by seeking
governmental assurance at oral argument that,
due to the McCarran Act, it would either “re-
scind the old [AGLOSO] list” and thus moot
the existing cases or else “promise” to utilize
the Act against the plaintiffs, in which case
“these proceedings should be stayed pending”
the completion of SACB hearings and the pos-
sible judicial review guaranteed under it. The
clerk concluded that if the SACB found the
JAFRC “subversive and if that finding is up-
held by the courts, the merger of the damage
from the two lists would make this case moot,”
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while if the JAFRC was found “to be lily white,
and if the Attorney General persists in leaving
the old list stand,” then the JAFRC “would still
have a cause of action.”
A fundamentally similar thirty-three-page
October 9, 1950 memo from one of Frank-
furter’s clerks also evoked the McCarran Act
to urge the Court to avoid rejecting the gov-
ernment’s arguments (advice that Frankfurter
ultimately rejected, just as Burton rejected
the above-discussed recommendation of his
clerk). Frankfurter’s clerk declared that the
complaining organizations had “fulfilled the
requirements for a justiciable controversy” and
had suffered “very real” harm, which had “sub-
stantially if indeterminately” reduced the “vol-
ume of constitutionally-protected controver-
sial ideas ‘competing in the market-place’”
and thus raised a “public as well as private in-
terest in allowing the suit.” However, he con-
cluded that the Court should “withhold relief
on the ground that insufficient justification has
been shown for interference with this exec-
utive function at this particular time and in
these particular instances,” above all because
“when considerations arising” from the Mc-
Carran Act “are placed in the scales, it seems
to me tolerably clear that the Court should not
now intervene.”
Justice Reed also ignored the advice of
one of his clerks (initials BAM), although in
the reverse direction. While the Court was con-
sidering whether to grant “cert” in the JAFRC
case, Reed’s clerk wrote a memo arguing that
the JAFRC had clearly “lost property” interests
due to its AGLOSO listing and that the loyalty
order had given the Attorney General an “awful
power,” whose procedures were “squarely at
odds with the most rudimentary notions of due
process and fair play.” Although, he argued, the
JAFRC was a “genuinely Communist and ‘sub-
versive’ outfit” and “there would be no doubt
but that after [an administrative or judicial]
hearing, its designation would remain as ‘sub-
versive,’” the “arbitrary power” granted the At-
torney General “to brand with this mark of the
pariah is so dangerous” that it was in the “direct
tradition of the medieval heresy court—and
inconsonant utterly with whole philosophy of
Anglo-American law.” He concluded that be-
fore allowing an official to publish “his black
list of heretical organizations, I should require
that they at least be given an opportunity to
hear the charges and meet them before their
reputation is ruined, their property made val-
ueless, and their existence jeopardized.” Reed
voted not to grant certiorari and, later, against
the organizations’ claims.
In other instances, the Justices accepted
impassioned recommendations from their
clerks. Justice William Douglas was advised
by a clerk (initials WMC), when the Court
was considering hearing the JAFRC’s appeal
in early 1950, that “it is not necessary to la-
bor the point that this is one of the most im-
portant certs of the year,” especially because
“these days, there are few more serious charges
that an organization or person is Communist”
and that it appeared that the Attorney Gen-
eral had abused his authority by publishing
the AGLOSO and ignoring “rudimentary fair-
ness” by denying the JAFRC “an opportunity
to be heard before listing it as subversive or
communist.” One of Justice Robert Jackson
clerk’s (initials AYC) similarly advised him to
grant cert in the JAFRC case, terming the ques-
tions raised therein “of great public importance
and significance.” According to the clerk, the
existing AGLOSO procedure amounted to a
“method of prescribing orthodoxy in thought,”
and what made the Attorney General’s powers
“so frightening” was the “complete lack of any
of the usual trappings of due process.” Clearly
referring to Jackson’s service as a prosecutor
of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, during
which hearings were held before organizations
were labeled “Nazi,” the clerk added, “I would
find it embarrassing, to say the least, to try to
explain why the German organizations were
given a complete trial” while “American orga-
nizations are not entitled to one here.”
The Court’s records indicate extraordi-
nary, intense, and prolonged divisions once the
Justices began to ponder the cases following
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the October 11, 1950 oral argument. While
sometimes contradictory, these records sug-
gest that, although the Justices discussed the
cases on October 14, quite unusually they did
not vote until a later meeting on either October
16 or October 21, and that, after first deadlock-
ing 4–4 (effectively upholding the lower court
rulings by failing to overturn them), ultimately
voted 5–3 against the government when Jus-
tice Jackson changed his position. Notes taken
by Douglas and Justice Stanley Reed at the
October 14 conference indicate that the three
dissenting judges—Reed, Chief Justice Fred
Vinson, and Justice Sherman Minton—agreed
that the three complaining AGLOSO organiza-
tions either had “no standing” to sue (Vinson’s
view) or, if they did, had “nothing to sue for”
(in Minton’s words) because (in Reed’s words)
“none” of their constitutional rights had been
“violated” and thus there was no “actual con-
troversy.”
The opposite position was articulated by
Douglas, Burton (who maintained that the At-
torney General “cannot without some hear-
ing call them subversive”) and Black (who
declared that “these organizations have been
destroyed” and that no governmental officials
could exercise the powers involved in the case
“without hearings, evidence, and the right to be
heard,” since such a proceeding “runs counter
to due process and our notion of fairness”).
Jackson’s comments were highly ambiguous,
suggesting that an AGLOSO listing amounted
to little more than “abuse piled on to the orga-
nization” and “one of the risks” that organiza-
tions had to face. His primary concern was that
individuals who faced loyalty dismissal pro-
ceedings due to AGLOSO ties have the right
to “challenge the rating of the organization”
and show it was not, in fact, “subversive,” and
therefore he intended to “wait on these three
[organizational] cases until the Court votes
on [the case of Dorothy] Bailey,” a loyalty
dismissal proceeding about which the Court
also heard oral argument on October 11, 1950.
The tally sheets maintained by several of the
Justices strongly suggest that Jackson at first
voted against granting relief to the three or-
ganizations: Both Vinson’s and Reed’s records
show the vote at 4–4 (with, in Reed’s records, a
vote for granting relief by Jackson erased and
replaced by an opposite vote), while Burton’s
tally shows a vote by Jackson against relief
erased and replaced by a positive vote, with the
final vote seemingly dated October 16, 1950
(although Frankfurter’s records place the vote
on October 21).
On October 23, Burton was assigned
to write an opinion for the Court, which
rejected the government’s position on an
extremely narrow basis by giving the com-
plaining organizations the right to further legal
proceedings to challenge their AGLOSO list-
ings, while not accepting any general attack on
the fundamental constitutionality of the con-
cept of the AGLOSO or the loyalty program.
Burton submitted a draft opinion on November
20, which Douglas joined on February 6. Dou-
glas also wrote a separate concurrence, which
he circulated on April 11. Separate concur-
ring opinions were circulated by Frankfurter
on December 21, Jackson on January 30, and
Black on February 9. Between Black’s opinion,
which created a definitive majority for over-
turning the lower court rulings and rebuffing
the government, and Reed’s dissenting opin-
ion of April 6, which was joined by Vinson
and Minton, Frankfurter and Jackson both ex-
ploded in rage over the Court’s proceedings.
Frankfurter’s anger centered on what he
viewed as the dissenters’ unconscionable delay
in circulating their views for many weeks after
the five majority Justices had submitted their
opinions (perhaps fearing that Jackson might
switch again or that some other development
would affect the vote), which he suggested vi-
olated the norms both of the Court and of “de-
cency.” In a private letter to Reed on March
19, 1951, Frankfurter fumed that “five months
have elapsed since a majority of the Court
voted to reverse these cases and nearly six
weeks have elapsed since [Black’s] last concur-
ring opinion for the judgment of reversal has
been circulated,” while the dissenters “could
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not have been in doubt about your position
since October 21st” (possibly the date of the
final 5–3 vote in the case). Frankfurter stated
that the dissenters’ action in “holding up the
judgment in the loyalty cases long after a ma-
jority has been ready for their disposition” had
“no equal since I have been on the court” and
“with considerable knowledge of the past do-
ings of the Court, I venture to believe noth-
ing like it has happened for at least 50 years.”
Noting that Reed had stated “in your engag-
ing way” that he was working on another case,
which from the “the point of view of any honest
workmanship, could not be possibly be ready
for a considerable stretch,” Frankfurter thun-
dered that “one of the most unquestioned un-
written laws of the Court is that a man should
put aside all to work on a dissent in a case that
is ready to go down,” a general “obligation,”
which here carried “special force” because the
case involved “interests of great importance,
both to the government and citizens.” This was
especially so, Frankfurter argued, because the
majority was calling for “readjustments by the
government” that “ought not to be delayed a
needless moment” and the “consequences to
which the procedure found unauthorized is day
to day giving rise are more widely radiating
than I think is fully realized,” so that “in all de-
cency” the Court’s ruling should not “be held
up any longer.” Although Reed submitted a
draft dissent on April 6, he circulated revised
versions on April 12, 13 and 21, leading Frank-
furter to explode again in an April 27 memo-
randum to all of the Justices, in which he urged
that “these cases come down without further
ado,” as “the lines have been drawn for more
than six months, and the demands of public
administration call for adjudication.”
While Frankfurter was fuming at his dis-
senting colleagues, Jackson appears to have
remained deeply ambivalent and at times in-
tensely angry about the Court’s handling of
the AGLOSO cases. His ambivalence appar-
ently largely derived from the collision of his
intense detestation of Communism and deep
disdain for Douglas, which may have inclined
him to originally side with the dissenters, with
his strong commitment to due process, which
inclined him in the other direction. What out-
raged him was that he viewed the Court’s
impending AGLOSO decision, which man-
dated additional due-process protections for
the complaining organizations, as totally con-
tradicting its pending decision to effectively
uphold Bailey’s federal loyalty firing without
providing the right to learn of or cross-examine
her accusers. While Jackson focused on the lat-
ter issue in his ultimately published, deeply an-
gry concurring opinion, his anger also surfaced
in his first draft concurrence, which was cir-
culated in late January 1951, and, above all, in
an amazingly bitter, uncirculated draft concur-
rence that he placed in his files in mid-April.
Jackson’s January draft bore only pass-
ing resemblance to his final published concur-
rence; in it he essentially attacked the Court
for lacking clarity in its holding and, espe-
cially, for allegedly providing AGLOSO orga-
nizations more protections than are granted to
individuals such as Bailey. Thus, Jackson ar-
gued in his draft that “due process requires
standards for administrative action,” but that
the loyalty program provided only “undefined
and indefinable generalities” in its use of terms
such as “subversiveness, totalitarianism, fas-
cism, or communism” and, indeed, of “loy-
alty” itself. He termed the AGLOSO listings
“administrative finding of a fact” made “with-
out notice to anybody, opportunity for hearing,
and standards,” which could be “made without
anything that a court would recognize as evi-
dence, and so far as the record available to this
court shows, it was so made.” The draft noted
in a footnote that at Nuremberg “every accused
organization had opportunity to offer evidence
in its defense” and “was confronted with and
had a chance to cross-examine all prosecution
witnesses,” and declared that “lack of notice
and lack of right to be heard I think preclude
acceptance of the Attorney General’s designa-
tion as final.”
Jackson’s anger completely boiled over
in the bitter, never-circulated April 12 draft
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“addendum” to his concurrence, by then sub-
stantially revised from his January draft, which
he explained as an attempt “expressly to dis-
sociate myself” from Justice Douglas’s April
11 draft concurrence. Jackson’s “addendum”
essentially accused the Court of having been
“soft on communism” in its recent rulings,
thereby blocking measures “which if taken
in time might well have prevented much of
the difficulty [in the loyalty area] that has
ensued.” Jackson thundered that attempts by
the Roosevelt administration to take “some of
the ‘strong measures’ against Communism to
which the [Douglas] opinion pays lips service”
had been “consistently defeated by this Court”
with Douglas’s endorsement, with the result
that “virtual assurance” had been given to
“government employees and others that Com-
munist organizations were quite proper for
them to join or affiliate with.” Instead of at-
tributing the government’s AGLOSO errors to
a “good faith mistake in an unsettled and de-
batable field,” Jackson declared that the Court
majority was joining the “Communist cam-
paign to smear our own government by ac-
cusing [AGLOSO] of being ‘totalitarian’ in
trend, of borrowing ‘totalitarian’ techniques,
of starting down a ‘totalitarian path’ and of tak-
ing a ‘leaf from totalitarian jurisprudence.’” In
his peroration, Jackson lamented that the gov-
ernment was now finding itself “denounced
as ‘totalitarians’—by one [i.e. Douglas] who
never has been able to see totalitarianism in any
Communist case before this Court . . . [T]he
gratuitous assault upon our own Government
from our highest Court ought to be repudiated
in the same source if we let truth instead of
amiable cowardice be our guide.”
On April 30, 1951, the Court made
headlines across the country when it finally
announced its ruling in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath. In what a
United Press dispatch termed a “bombshell”
decision, the Court clearly, as the Associated
Press lead summarized, “lashed out at the gov-
ernment for branding organizations as Com-
munist without a hearing,” yet simultaneously
failed to give the plaintiffs anything even ap-
proaching a complete victory. Of the eight par-
ticipating Justices, six of them wrote sepa-
rate, often-heated, opinions that totaled 40,000
words, or seventy pages in print. As they an-
nounced the ruling by reading long excerpts
from their written opinions, Jackson com-
mented acidly that hearing them was “likely
to make one delirious,” while Clark, who had
not participated in the case, sat by quietly.21
Five Justices—Burton, in a controlling
opinion joined only by Douglas, with sepa-
rate concurring opinions by Douglas, Jack-
son, Frankfurter, and Black—agreed only that,
based on the uncontested factual record before
them, since the government had not contested
any of the plaintiffs’ factual assertions con-
cerning their nature and post-AGLOSO dam-
age to their ability to function, the complaining
organizations had standing to sue, that the dis-
pute was justiciable, and that the challenged
AGLOSO determinations, in the absence of
any process allowing contestation of disputed
listings, were so “arbitrary” that their cases
should be returned to a federal district court
for “determination” as to whether the organiza-
tions “are in fact Communistic or whether the
Attorney General possesses information from
which he could reasonably find them to be so.”
The Court specifically ordered the cases re-
manded to district court “with instructions to
deny the respondents’ [government’s] motion
that the complaint can be dismissed for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”
In his controlling opinion, Burton held
that, in “listing” the three organizations the
government had done nothing that “purports to
adjudicate the truth of [their] allegations that
they are not in fact Communistic.” Because
the Justice Department had failed to contest
their denials and had only moved to dismiss
their suits as lacking standing and justiciabil-
ity, Burton held that, under legal precedent,
the government had “therefore admitted” the
“facts alleged in the complaint,” which must
be “taken as true,” and the Court therefore
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Harold H. Burton (right) was appointed to the Court in 1945 by President Truman (left), the instigator of the
AGLOSO. Justice Burton wrote the controlling opinion for the Court in 1951, calling the Attorney General’s
actions “arbitrary and unauthorized” because Truman’s loyalty order had not required that organizations be
properly investigated before being placed on the list.
was compelled to find their AGLOSO listings
“patently arbitrary,” because Truman’s order
did not authorize the Attorney General to list
them “contrary to the alleged and uncontro-
versial facts constituting the entire record be-
fore us.” Burton said the situation would be
“comparable” if “the Attorney General, un-
der like circumstances, were to designate the
American National Red Cross as a commu-
nist organization” in the absence of “any con-
trary claim asserted against” its general repu-
tation as a charitable and loyal organization.
Burton’s opinion flatly rejected the govern-
ment’s position on standing and justiciability,
holding that “the touchstone to justiciability
is injury to a legally protected right[,] and
the right of a bona fide charitable organiza-
tion to carry on its work, free from defama-
tory statements of the kind discussed, is such a
right.” Brushing aside the government’s posi-
tion that the AGLOSO caused no direct harm
to listed organizations, Burton declared that
the impact of the AGLOSO listing was to
“cripple the functioning and damage the rep-
utation of these organizations.” The Attorney
General’s actions were labeled both “arbitrary
and unauthorized,” amounting to administra-
tive discretion “run riot,” because, according
to Burton, Truman’s loyalty order had required
that listings be preceded by “appropriate inves-
tigation and determination,” yet the Attorney
General’s actions had lacked “reliance upon ei-
ther disclosed or undisclosed facts supplying
a reasonable basis for the determination.” In
the present case, Burton said, Truman’s order
failed to “authorize, much less direct, the ex-
ercise of any such absolute power as would
permit the inclusion in the Attorney General’s
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list of a designation that is patently arbitrary or
contrary to fact,” but the challenged AGLOSO
listings were “unauthorized publications of ad-
mittedly unfounded designations of the com-
plaining organizations as ‘Communist.’”
Burton added that it would “obviously”
be contrary to the intent of the Truman or-
der to “confer power on anyone to act arbitrar-
ily or capriciously—even assuming a constitu-
tional power to do so” or to include AGLOSO
designations that were “patently arbitrary and
contrary to the uncontroversial material facts,”
and that an “appropriate” governmental “de-
termination” had to be “the result of a process
of reasoning” and not “an arbitrary fiat con-
trary to the known facts.” Burton concluded,
“Whether the complaining organizations are
in fact Communistic or whether the Attorney
General possesses information from which he
could reasonably find them to be so must await
determination by the [federal] district court”
that had first dismissed the lawsuits. While the
only clear mandate of the ruling was to refer
the cases back to federal district court, in a
footnote Burton seemed to suggest that if the
government provided an “administrative hear-
ing” at which organizations proposed for list-
ing were allowed to “present evidence on their
own behalf” and to be informed on the “ev-
idence on which the designations rest,” that
might suffice to make the AGLOSO process
constitutional henceforth.
In their concurrences, Black and Douglas
both suggested that the entire loyalty program
was unconstitutional, and Black characterized
the entire concept of an official list of sub-
versive organizations (with or without hear-
ings) as such. However, Burton’s controlling
opinion was drawn extremely narrowly to fo-
cus only on the “outer limit of the authority
of the Attorney General” to list organizations
without any kind of legal process. Thus, in a
footnote, Burton noted that the Court specif-
ically declined to rule on the validity of the
government’s “acts in furnishing and dissemi-
nating a comparable list in any instance where
such acts are within the authority purportedly
granted by the executive order.” The ruling
even failed to indicate whether the entire ex-
isting “list”—as opposed to the listing of the
three challenging organizations—was invalid
pending further proceedings, if the three com-
plaining groups were to be “delisted” pend-
ing the federal court determination, if all fu-
ture AGLOSO designations had to be preceded
by some kind of “administrative hearing” (as
seemed to be suggested in the footnote ref-
erenced above), or if the sole future recourse
of listed organizations was to challenge their
designations in federal court, presumably after
considerable damage to their reputations had
already occurred. Thus, the immediate result
of the ruling was primarily, as the Associated
Press reported, to throw a “legal cloud” over
the AGLOSO but to clearly establish little be-
yond that.
Jackson’s concurrence, which sometimes
read like a dissent, complained about the “ex-
travagance” and “intemperance” of some of the
opinions, lamenting that it was “unfortunate
that this court should flounder in wordy dis-
agreement over the validity and effect of proce-
dures which have already been pursued for sev-
eral years,” and declaring that the rulings “may
create the impression that the decision of the
case does not rise above the political contro-
versy that engendered it.” Jackson also blasted
the Court for its separate ruling issued the same
day, upholding by a 4–4 vote (by failing to re-
verse the lower courts) Dorothy Bailey’s loy-
alty dismissal. Jackson lamented, “This is the
first time this court has held rights of individu-
als subordinate and inferior to those organized
groups,” terming it an “inverted view of the
law” and “justice turned bottom-side up.” He
added that it was “beyond my understanding
how a court whose collective opinion is that
the [AGLOSO] designations are subject to ju-
dicial inquiry can at the same time say that a
discharge based at least in part on them is not.”
With regard to the AGLOSO itself, Jackson
said that “if the only effect of the loyalty or-
der was that suffered by the organizations,” he
would “think their right to relief very dubious,”
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because the designation deprived them of “no
legal right or immunity,” and they suffered
only due to the “sanctions applied by public
disapproval, not by law.” However, Jackson
continued, because of the AGLOSO’s impact
upon federal employees accused of association
with listed groups and their inability to chal-
lenge the designations in loyalty proceedings,
he would reverse the lower court rulings up-
holding the AGLOSO “for lack of due pro-
cess in denying a hearing at any stage,” be-
cause “unless a hearing is provided in which
the organization can present evidence as to its
character, a presumption of disloyalty is en-
tered against its every member employee, and
because of it, he may be branded disloyal, dis-
charged, and rendered ineligible for govern-
ment service.”
Frankfurter’s concurrence, at twenty-five
pages by far the longest of the six opinions,
declared that the “heart of the matter” was that
democratic principles implied “respect for the
elementary rights of men, however suspect or
unworthy,” particularly the practice of “fair-
ness,” which could “rarely be obtained by se-
cret, one-sided determination of facts decisive
of rights,” which served to “maim and decap-
itate” listed organizations “on the mere say-
so of the Attorney General.” Even if the des-
ignation directly “imposes no legal sanctions
on these organizations” and “does not directly
deprive anyone of liberty or property,” Frank-
furter wrote, “it would be blindness” to fail to
“recognize that in the conditions of our time
such designation,” issued by the “highest law
officer of the government,” in practice “dras-
tically restricts the organizations, if it does not
proscribe them.” He added that “due process”
requirements were “perhaps the most majestic
concept in our whole constitutional system,”
and were not “a fair-weather or timid assur-
ance,” but required respect “in periods of calm
and in times of trouble” and should be “partic-
ularly heeded at times of agitation and anxiety,
when fear and suspicion impregnate the air we
breathe.” Perhaps suggesting that his dissent-
ing colleagues were bending in the political
wind, Frankfurter pointedly declared that the
nation’s Founding Fathers had “put their trust
in a judiciary truly independent” by making
them “not subject to the fears or allurements
of a limited tenure and by the very nature of
their function detached from passing and par-
tisan influences.”
In his concurrence, Douglas said that the
“paramount issue of the age” was the need
to reconcile the need to provide both “secu-
rity” and “freedom.” But he warned that when
the country took “shortcuts by borrowing from
the totalitarian techniques of our opponents,”
it opened the way to “a subversive influence
of our own that destroys us from within,” a
trend illustrated by the AGLOSO and Bai-
ley cases. Douglas declared that organizations
branded “subversive” by the Attorney Gen-
eral suffered the “real, immediate, and incal-
culable” injury of being “maimed and crip-
pled,” and that, as currently administered, the
AGLOSO had “no place in our system of law,”
but only planted “within the body politic the
virus of the totalitarian ideology which we op-
pose.” Given that the “subversive” label “may
well destroy the group against whom” it was
directed, Douglas wrote, “when the govern-
ment becomes the moving party and levels
its great powers against the citizen, it should
be held to the same standards of fair dealing
as we prescribe for other legal contests,” and
to let the government adopt “such lesser ones
as suits the convenience of its officers is to
start down the totalitarian path.” Douglas ar-
gued that the “rudiments of justice, as we know
it, call for notice and hearing,” since the gov-
ernment “cannot by edict condemn or place
beyond the pale” and “no more critical gov-
ernmental ruling can be made against an or-
ganization these days” than by branding them
“subversive,” which, under existing practice,
“destroys without opportunity to be heard.”
Alone among the Justices, Black’s con-
currence specifically declared that the gov-
ernment had no authority “with or without
a hearing” to “determine, list, and publicize
individuals and groups as traitors and public
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enemies,” a practice he said was “tyrannical”
and “smacks of a most evil type of censor-
ship” and one that”effectively punished many
organizations and their members merely be-
cause of their political beliefs and utterances.”
Black added that AGLOSO proceedings pos-
sessed “almost every quality of bills of at-
tainder,” which were specifically forbidden by
the Constitution, because they amounted to
“executive investigations, condemnations, and
blacklists as a substitute for imposition of le-
gal types of penalties by courts following trial
and conviction in accordance with procedu-
ral safeguards of the bill of rights.” But, he
lamented, “[i]n this day when prejudice, hate,
and fear are constantly invoked to justify irre-
sponsible smears and persecutions of persons
even faintly suspected of entertaining unpop-
ular views, it may be futile to suggest that the
cause of internal security would be fostered,
not hurt, by faithful adherence to our constitu-
tional guarantees of individual liberty.” Brand-
ing the AGLOSO a “much publicized” black-
list, Black said the designations of the three
complaining organizations found them “guilty
of harboring treasonable opinions and designs”
and “officially branded them as communists,”
labels that “in the present climate of public
opinion” and “regardless of their truth or fal-
sity, are the practical equivalents of confisca-
tion and death sentences for any blacklisted
organization not possessing extraordinary fi-
nancial, political, or religious prestige and in-
fluence.”
The single dissenting opinion, written
by Reed and joined by Vinson and Minton,
endorsed all of the government’s key argu-
ments, holding that listed organizations suf-
fered no concrete damage from the AGLOSO,
that the AGLOSO’s purpose of aiding gov-
ernment personnel loyalty investigations was
valid, that listed organizations had no “ba-
sis for any court action,” and that “in inves-
tigations to determine the purposes of sus-
pected organizations, the Government should
be free to proceed without notice or hearing”
because such loyalty-program-related desig-
nations did “not require ‘proof’ in the sense of
a court proceeding” and “to allow petitioners
entry into the investigation would amount to in-
terference with the executive’s discretion.” Ac-
cording to the dissenters, although AGLOSO
listings presumably could be “hurtful” to the
“prestige, reputation, and earning power” of
designated groups, those groups lost no First
Amendment or property rights, because they
were “not ordered to do anything and are not
punished for doing anything” and were not de-
prived “of liberty of speech or other freedom.”
According to Reed, AGLOSO listings did not
even constitute “guilt by association,” because
they only amounted to a “warning” to federal
officials to “investigate the conduct of the em-
ployee and his opportunity for harm.” Reed’s
opinion added that the Attorney General’s list
sought only to aid loyalty investigations, and
was unquestionably “preferable” to investiga-
tions of organizations “by each of the more
than a hundred” government agencies, while
“to require a determination as to each organi-
zation for the administrative hearing of each
employee investigated for disloyalty would be
impossible.” The dissenters declared the desig-
nations were presumably made after “appropri-
ate investigation and determination” and that,
in aid of making loyalty determinations re-
garding federal personnel, “in investigations
to determine the purposes of suspected orga-
nizations, the Government should be free to
proceed without notice or hearing.”
The McGrath ruling proved largely a
Pyrrhic victory for the organizations that of-
ficially “won” their case, but it marked the be-
ginning of a very slow and agonizing end for
the AGLOSO, which ultimately took twenty-
three years to die. The Justice Department
stalled and puzzled over McGrath for two
years before finally issuing, under the new
Eisenhower administration in April 1953, a
set of AGLOSO hearing regulations that were
grossly biased in favor of the government.
Organizations that sought to challenge their
designations were given thirty days to act
and then required to respond to numerous
86 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY
The Red Scare blacklisting predated the rise to power of Joseph McCarthy, pictured here in 1954 sharing a
laugh with his counsel Roy Cohn at a Senate subcommittee session.
detailed inquiries, which effectively forced
them to become police informers on them-
selves. Moreover, the same Attorney General
who originally sought to designate them made
the final decision on that designation after
obtaining recommendations from hearing of-
ficers. The new Attorney General, Herbert
Brownell, “relisted” all of the previously des-
ignated 192 AGLOSO groups in April 1953,
while also proposing sixty-two additions and
announcing the new hearing rules. However,
the effect of being listed was so devastat-
ing, the requirements to obtain a hearing so
onerous, and the government so determined
to avoid granting hearings that only one such
hearing was ever held, involving the minis-
cule Independent Socialist League (ISL) and
two affiliated organizations. In all other cases,
the listed groups were already defunct, failed
to request hearings, or asked but were de-
nied them on the grounds that their responses
to the government’s detailed inquiries were
inadequate.22
The ISL hearing was held in 1955 and
1956. The government delayed issuing a find-
ing thereafter for two years and the new Attor-
ney General, William Rogers, then abandoned
the case on June 18, 1958. In the meantime,
the Red Scare had markedly diminished, espe-
cially with the Korean War armistice of 1953,
Democratic victories in the November 1954
congressional elections, the Senate censure
of Senator McCarthy the following month, a
growing storm of congressional and other crit-
icism of the AGLOSO and other Red Scare ex-
cesses after 1954, and an increasing inclination
of the Supreme Court to strike down govern-
ment “anti-subversive” measures after 1956.
The government never designated any more
AGLOSO organizations after 1954, and in two
1957 cases agreed to “delist” two Lithuanian
organizations that challenged their listings in
court, for fear that that the Supreme Court
would declare the AGLOSO unconstitutional
in toto if the cases reached them. Similar con-
cerns led the Justice Department to drop efforts
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to list the National Lawyers Guild in 1958, af-
ter five years of litigation.23
As the AGLOSO gradually diminished in
public consciousness and became increasingly
moribund in general, Supreme Court rulings
in the 1960s effectively dismantled the 1950
McCarran Act, designed to force “Commu-
nist” and “Communist front” groups to “regis-
ter” with the government following hearings
before the SACB. After the SACB then in-
creasingly came under attack in the late 1960s
as having nothing to do and serving as a po-
litical sinecure, President Richard Nixon at-
tempted to revive both the AGLOSO and the
SACB by issuing Executive Order 11605 on
July 2, 1971, which transferred to the SACB
the power to designate AGLOSO organizations
following referrals from the Attorney General
and hearings, a response both to McGrath and
to criticism that, under the 1953 Justice De-
partment AGLOSO regulations, the Attorney
General acted as both prosecutor and judge.
However, as opposition to the Vietnam War
and to growing revelations of government spy-
ing rose in the 1960s, Nixon was bitterly at-
tacked in Congress for seeking to both foster
repression and usurp congressional authority
by his executive order, with the legislative op-
position lead by Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) in
what amounted to a preview of the Watergate
hearings Ervin would lead soon thereafter. In
1972, Congress killed the SACB by defund-
ing it, and in 1974, by then deeply enmeshed
in the Watergate scandal, Nixon abolished
the AGLOSO via Executive Order 11785,
signed on June 4, 1974, two months before his
resignation.24
The three McGrath organizations took
their case back to federal district court in late
1951 to determine if the government was justi-
fied in its AGLOSO designations—which the
government never removed—as provided for
by McGrath. Before the years of litigation that
followed were completed, the IWO was liqui-
dated as an insurance corporation in 1953 as a
result of judicial proceedings in New York (the
Supreme Court refused to hear the IWO’s ap-
peal in this case) and the JAFRC disbanded in
early 1955, citing government “harassments,
persecutions, and prosecutions” that made it
“impossible to carry on” its “good and nec-
essary work.” Ten years after it first sued the
government over its AGLOSO designation, the
NCASF threw in the legal towel in March 1957,
following a federal appeals court ruling that,
by not seeking an administrative hearing under
the 1953 Justice Department regulations, the
organization had failed to exhaust its available
administrative remedies and therefore was not
entitled to relief in the courts. The organiza-
tion won a small triumph in May 1963, when
a federal appeals court held that the SACB’s
1956 finding that it was a “communist front”
was based on “negligible” evidence and could
not be sustained. None of the nation’s major
newspapers reported the ruling.25
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